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Abstract 
  This paper reports results from a unique two-stage experiment designed to examine the 
spillover effects of optimism and pessimism.  In stage 1, we induce optimism or pessimism onto 
subjects by randomly assigning a high or low piece rate for performing a cognitive task.  We find 
that participants receiving the low piece rate are significantly more pessimistic with respect to 
performance on this task.  In stage 2 individuals participate in an ultimatum game.  We find that 
minimum acceptable offers are significantly lower for pessimistic subjects, though this 
pessimism was generated in a completely unrelated environment.  These results highlight the 
existence of important spillover effects that can be behaviorally and economically important - for 
example, pessimism regarding one’s initial conditions (e.g., living in poverty) may have spillover 
effects on one’s future labor market outcomes. 
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Individuals’ expectations play an important role in most decision environments.  As such, 
the presence of any bias in subjective expectations can affect many economic outcomes.  Two of 
the most common types of biases affecting expectations (and hence outcomes) are the tendencies 
for optimism and pessimism in individuals’ beliefs and attitudes.  Optimism or “over-
confidence”, for example, can take on many forms (see Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Rabin, 
1998).  Overconfidence may increase the likelihood of dispute in a bargaining environment 
(Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Dickinson, 2006), affect the manner in which individuals 
make financial decisions (Barber and Odean, 2001; Odean, 1998),  or increase the likelihood of 
careless decisions if the over-confidence is with respect to one’s driving skills (Svenson, 1981) 
or one’s health (Weinstein, 1980).  Though some psychology research explores pessimism (e.g., 
in depressed individuals: see Pyszczynski et al., 1987), much of the research in both psychology 
and economics has focused on optimism and self-serving beliefs.  However, it is important to 
note than in many circumstances overconfidence in one domain implies pessimism in another: 
overconfidence in the information one receives (as in Rabin and Schrag, 1999) or in the advice 
received from others (as in Rabin, 2002) implies pessimism in one’s own private information and 
relative abilities.  Experimentally, Heolzl and Rustichini (2005) studied the effect of optimism in 
one’s relative ability in a skill task.  While individuals are optimistic in their own abilities, results 
suggest that pessimism is more prevalent when facing more difficult tasks, especially when 
money is at stake.   
This present paper examines expectations in a unique environment in which we explore 
first how optimism and pessimism can be induced and, secondly, how optimism and pessimism 
in one area can affect behavioral outcomes in another.  We begin by examining laboratory 
  1induced beliefs with respect to one’s own performance in a letter-ordering task.  We find that 
optimism/pessimism can be induced via the ex post random assignment of a high or low piece-
rate wage for performing this cognitive task.  We observe significantly more pessimism (i.e., 
expected output less than actual output) among subjects who are randomly assigned a low piece-
rate wage.  The opposite occurs (i.e., optimism) for subjects paid the high piece-rate wage.  Our 
ability to induce optimism or pessimism in this environment can be explained by theories of 
cognitive dissonance (e.g., Aronson 1992), where the generation of an optimistic or pessimistic 
belief can reduce an inherent conflict between cognitions.  We then conduct a second stage 
experiment in which these same subjects engage in a simple bargaining (ultimatum) game.   
Our results highlight two important conclusions:  First, consistent with cognitive 
dissonance theories, we are able to induce optimism or pessimism with the initial (random) wage 
assignment.  With respect to the first-stage task, this implies that we can successfully manipulate 
one’s ability-beliefs in the lab.  Secondly, subjects who received this low piece-rate in stage one 
were willing to accept significantly lower offers in a second-stage ultimatum game.  This finding 
is striking, demonstrating the presence of both belief manipulation and spillovers of those beliefs 
into behavioral outcomes in an unrelated and distinct experimental environment. 
There is increasing evidence in the psychology literature that one’s beliefs regarding 
future outcomes (so-called “dispositional optimism-pessimism”) are a dimension of personality 
that affects life-choices and outcomes (Heinonen, et al., 2005).  The important implication is that 
optimism-pessimism in one environment may not be independent from optimism-pessimism in 
another.  For example, if dispositional pessimism at one point in time can significantly predict 
one’s tendency to be passive or withdraw effort (Scheier and Carver, 1985), and if such a 
disposition is persistent and stable, then an event that affects one’s disposition will have spillover 
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investment choice, etc.).   For example, Goldsmith et al (1997) shows that one’s “psychological 
capital” significantly affects labor market earnings.  Specifically, an investment in one’s 
psychological capital is estimated to increase wages by even more than a comparable investment 
in human capital.  Thus, whatever initially contributes to an individual’s stock of psychological 
capital has important spillovers into measurable labor market outcomes.   
The presence of dispositional optimism and pessimism can be directly related to emotions 
and self-esteem.  For example, a recent review in psychology concludes that positive emotions 
are a causal factor in successful life outcomes of various sorts (Lyubomirky and King, 2005).  
While separable from positive emotion or affect, Lucas et al. (1996) find that optimism is related 
to positive affect.  This type of result conforms with those of Charness and Levin (2005) who 
find that “emotional reinforcement” induced by payment can explain deviations from Bayesian 
updating.  From the standpoint of Lucas et al. (1996), this suggests that the affect created by 
emotional reinforcement affects the optimism and pessimism individuals may have in their 
decisions, leading to non-Bayesian behaviors.  Generalizing, this literature suggests that 
optimism and pessimism may play causal roles in many outcomes which have significant 
longitudinal or experimental effects, such as work absenteeism, marital well-being, charitable 
giving, and judgment accuracy, among others (see Lyunbomirky and King, 2005).   
In terms of self-esteem, psychologists consider certain events or environments can 
ascribe self-esteem (Lane, 1991; Glietman, 1991), which relates to dispositional optimism-
pessimism.  Here, we utilize a laboratory manipulation to ascribe a type of optimism-pessimism.  
Self-esteem and dispositional optimism-pessimism are considered clear contributors to one’s 
outlook and outcomes in life (Scheier and Carver, 1985; Lyunbomirky and King, 2005), and we 
  3are able to recreate a useful microcosm of this relationship in a simple lab environment where 
beliefs spill over into separate but meaningful behavioral differences that can have economically 
significant consequences. 
 
2.  EXPERIMENTS  
We conducted experiments to explore the factors inducing optimism and pessimism and 
the associated spillover effects of induced optimism and pessimism in a simple bargaining 
context (i.e. the ultimatum game). 
Experiment 1 
In experiment 1, participants took part in a grammatical reasoning task (i.e., a modified 
version of the task in Baddeley, 1968).  In this task, participants were given a short sentence 
describing the ordering of either three or four alphabetic letters.  These sentences were displayed 
individually for three seconds, with five seconds between each sentence.  After observing a 
sentence for three seconds, participants wrote down the proper ordering of the letters as 
described in the sentence.  For example, if an individual encountered the sentence "A is followed 
by D is followed by B is preceded by C" she would have to write down CADB to have correctly 
ordered the letters in accord with the sentence.  Similarly, if the participant encountered the 
sentence "Z does not proceed X does not follow Y," she would have to write down XZY to have 
correctly ordered the letters.
1  A total of 64 letter ordering sentences were displayed to 
participants. 
  Prior to undertaking the task, participants were informed of the incentives they faced in 
the experiment.  Specifically, participants were informed that they would either be paid $0.25 or 
                                                 
1 Instructions describing the rules to be used when ordering letters provided in the appendix and are such that there 
is a unique letter-ordering to each sentence when using the rule given to subjects. 
  4$1.25 for each correct letter ordering on their answer sheet and that the piece rate would only be 
revealed after the task was completed.  That is, participants did not know which piece rate 
applied at the time they undertook the task. 
  After the grammatical reasoning portion of the experiment, participants’ answer sheets 
were collected by the experimenter and participants were informed regarding which piece rate 
would apply (i.e., $0.25 or $1.25).  After learning which rate applied, participants were asked two 
questions.  First, participants were asked to indicate a scale of 1 to 10 how much they enjoyed 
the task.  Secondly, participants were asked to estimate the number of questions they answered 
correctly, receiving an additional $5 payment if their estimate was correct and an additional $3 
payment if their estimate was within two of the actual number of correct answers.
2  
Hypotheses 
  With regard to experiment 1, we put forth two hypotheses.  First, with respect to the task 
enjoyment question, we hypothesize that individuals receiving the lower piece rate (i.e. $0.25) 
will report higher levels of enjoyment than those receiving the higher piece rate (i.e. $1.25).  This 
follows the previous literature on cognitive dissonance (e.g., Aronson, 1992, 1994; Festinger, 
1957) and particularly the experiments of Festinger and Carlsmith (1959).  In these experiments 
individuals participating in a mundane task were paid either $1 or $20 to claim to another 
individual that the task was enjoyable. Surprisingly, individuals who were paid less for 
intimating the task as enjoyable reported greater levels of task enjoyment.  According to the 
theory of cognitive dissonance, individuals who were paid less were in a greater state of 
dissonance (i.e., conflict between the cognitions “I was paid $1 to tell someone the task was 
interesting,” and “I found the task boring.”) and hence reduced dissonance by altering their 
                                                 
2 The displaying of sentences and the enjoyment and expectations questions were programmed using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007). Participants responses to the sentences were written down on an answer sheet provided by 
experimenter and scored manually. 
  5perceived enjoyment of the task; individuals receiving $20 had less dissonance as the 
compensation provided a rationale for communicating the task was enjoyable.
3
  According to the theory of cognitive dissonance, an individual experiences dissonance 
when her actions and cognitions are in conflict.  In some instances, it may prove easier to change 
one’s cognitions (e.g., enjoyment of a mundane task) than changing one’s actions. In our 
experiments, participants experience a conflict between the cognitions “I engaged in a boring 
task” (here, ordering letter sequences) and “I was paid $X for engaging in the task.”  In our 
experiments, participants receiving the high piece rate have an extrinsic reason for having 
exerted effort or participated in the task.  These individuals are therefore less likely to experience 
dissonance in the experiment.  On the other hand, those participants who received the low piece 
rate have a much weaker extrinsic reason for having participated.  As such, these individuals are 
in a state of dissonance and look for an intrinsic rationalization for having participated, namely 
greater enjoyment of the task. Hence we have the following: 
H1.1  Individuals who learn (ex post) that they have received the lower piece 
rate will express higher levels of enjoyment for the task than did those 
who received the higher piece rate. 
 
  Our second hypothesis focuses on individuals’ expectations regarding performance.  
Based on the logic above, individuals who receive the low piece rate are in a state of dissonance 
relative to those who received the higher piece rate.  In addition to reducing dissonance via 
greater subjective task enjoyment, these individuals may adjust their beliefs regarding their 
ability in the task to reduce dissonance.  Given the conflict between the cognitions described 
above, Beauvois and Joule (1996) argue that incorporating additional cognitions (as opposed to 
                                                 
3 Similar effects are documented in Aronson and Carlsmith (1963), Aronson and Mills (1959), Axsom and Cooper 
(1985), and Cooper and Worchel (1970).  For a review of the theory of cognitive dissonance (and the various 
theories falling under its umbrella), see Aronson (1992) and the subsequent commentaries.   
  6changing cognitions) is a mechanism to reduce dissonance.
4  Within this framework, an 
individual may incorporate cognitions related to her ability to reduce dissonance, thereby 
providing additional rationalization for the effort they exerted in the task. 
  With respect to our experiment, individuals receiving the low piece rate are be in a state 
of dissonance given the conflict between the cognitions “I exerted effort to earn a large sum of 
money,” and “I received the low piece rate.”  Incorporating the cognition “I'm not good at this 
task” reduces the difference between an individual's expected payout under the high piece rate 
and their payout to the low piece rate.  Incorporating the latter cognition implies that individuals 
receiving the low piece rate will be pessimistic in their abilities, thereby reducing the dissonance 
created by having exerted effort only to receive a low return (i.e., low piece rate) to their effort.  
On the other hand, individuals who received a high piece rate do not experience the same 
character of dissonance. As a result, these individuals are more likely to be unbiased or 
optimistic regarding their performance on the task. Thus, we have the following hypotheses: 
H1.2  Individuals who learn (ex post) that they have received the lower piece 
rate will be pessimistic in their abilities. 
 
H1.3  Individuals who learn (ex post) that they have received the high piece rate 
will be optimistic in their abilities. 
 
3.  RESULTS 
  Table 1 presents the average scores and expectations for participants receiving the high 
($1.25) and low ($0.25) piece rates.  We identify no differences between scores or expected 
scores across piece rates (Wilcoxon p=0.582 and p=0.944).  However, in line with theories and 
experiments in cognitive dissonance, we do identify a difference between the subjective level of 
                                                 
4 This approach is based on the idea of a “dissonance ratio” measured as the number of dissonant cognitions divided 
by the sum of dissonant and consonant cognitions.  This formulation was originally suggested by Festinger (1957) 
and is advocated by Beauvois and Joule (1996). 
  7enjoyment (rated on a scale from 1 to 10) across participants receiving different piece rates 
(Wilcoxon p=0.053).  This suggests that the experimental manipulation fostered dissonance in 
participants receiving the low rate.  These individuals reduced dissonance by (retrospectively) 
enjoying the task more. 
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Table 1: Mean (st. dev.) of scores, expectations, and subjective enjoyment in Experiment 1. 
 
  To measure optimism and pessimism, we calculate the difference between a participant’s 
expectation and score.  This difference is positive for optimistic participants and negative for 
pessimistic participants.  Figure 1 presents the distributions of these differences by piece rate. 
For those participants receiving the high piece rate the mean difference is 1.69 ( 11.47 σ = ); for 
those participants receiving the low piece rate the mean difference is -1.36 ( 11.61 σ = ).  Non-
parametric Wilcoxon tests reject the hypothesis that the samples are drawn from the same 
distribution ( ), suggesting that participants receiving the higher piece rate were more 
























Figure 1:  Distributions of degree of optimism/pessimism (i.e., difference between score and 
expected score) by piece rate in Experiment 1. 
 
Experiment 2 
  In our second experiment we explore the spillover effects of induced optimism-
pessimism on economic behavior in a simple bargaining setting.  In experiment 2 individuals 
participated in the grammatical reasoning experiment described above.  Following the 
grammatical reasoning stage, individuals participated in a simple $10 ultimatum game using the 
strategy method as employed by Oxoby and McLeish (2004) in which the ultimatum game is 
portrayed as an extensive form game in which (i) nature chooses each player's role, (ii) the 
proposer chooses her offer and (iii) the responder accepts or rejects. .  In the context of our 
experiment, individuals were described the ultimatum game (in the initial instructions) and were 
  9asked to enter an offer (to be implemented were they assigned the role of proposer) and enter 
accept/reject decisions for each possible offer they could receive (to be implemented if assigned 
the role of responder).
5  This enables us to calculate for each participant an offer and a minimum 
acceptable offer. 
  After all participants entered this information, individuals were paired and randomly 
assigned the role of either proposer or responder.  Given these assignments, the respective offer 
and accept/reject decisions were implemented.  Note that in the ultimatum game portion of the 
experiment participants were randomly paired and did not know the piece rate that had been paid 
to the individual with whom they were matched.  As such, individuals (if they were conscious of 
the effect of piece rates on beliefs) did not know whether they were matched with an optimistic 
or pessimistic participant.  Payoffs from the grammatical reasoning and the ultimatum game 
stages of experiment were paid privately at the end of experiment. 
Hypotheses 
  We put forth two hypotheses regarding the effects of optimism and pessimism in 
ultimatum bargaining.  Our first hypothesis is in regards to the effect of optimism or pessimism 
on offers in the ultimatum game. 
H2.1  Optimistic (pessimistic) individuals extend lower (higher) offers in the 
ultimatum game than pessimistic (optimistic) individuals. 
 
This hypothesis follows previous experiments exploring the effects of affective state on behavior 
economic decision making (e.g., Capra, 2004; Hillman et al, 2004; McLeish and Oxoby, 2007). 
Similarly, with respect to minimum acceptable offers (MAO) we expect pessimistic individuals 
to be willing to accept lower offers. 
                                                 
5 Previous research has demonstrated that this method of eliciting decisions in the ultimatum game does not affect 
the character of play in the ultimatum game. See Oxoby and McLeish (2004) for a discussion of this literature. 
  10H2.2  Pessimistic (optimistic) individuals put forth lower (higher) minimum 




Table 2 presents the summary statistics from Experiment 2.  As in Experiment 1, we find 
no differences in performance on the grammatical reasoning task or expectations across piece 
rates (Wilcoxon p>0.50 for each).  However, we do identify differences in the distribution of 
optimism/pessimism as measured by the differences between expected and actual performance 
(see Figure 2): Wilcoxon p=0.052 between those receiving the high piece rate (mean 4.03, 
9.78 σ = ) and those receiving the low piece rate (mean -0.18,  12.15 σ = ) suggesting results 
comparable with the results of our experiment 1.  Also, as in experiment 1, we identify 
differences between the distributions of elicited enjoyment across piece rates differ (p=0.058), in 
the direction predicted by the cognitive dissonance hypothesis. 
 
  Score Expected  Score Enjoyment  Offer  MAO 
 




























































Figure 2:  Distributions of degree of optimism/pessimism (i.e., difference between score and 
expected score) by piece rate in Experiment 2. 
 
 
  With respect to behavior in the ultimatum game, we identify no differences in the offers 
across piece rate groups (Wilcoxon p=0.94) and thereby reject hypothesis H2.1.  However, we 
do identify differences in the minimum acceptable offers across each group: Individuals 
receiving the low piece rate (who were consequently pessimistic) were willing to accept lower 
offers than those receiving the high piece rate (who were optimistic). These differences are 
significant (Wilconxon p=0.025)  and we are able to reject the hypothesis that the distributions 
of MAO by piece rate are drawn from the same population. The distributions of MAO are 
























Figure 3:  Distributions of minimum acceptable offers by piece rate in Experiment 2. 
 
  Moreover, we identify a direct effect of the degree of optimism/pessimism on minimum 
acceptable offers.  Specifically, we regress MAO on the degree of optimism/pessimism and piece 
rates, identifying separate coefficients for each piece rate.  That is we estimate 
1 1.25 2 1.25 3 1.25 4 1.25 (1 ) (1 ) . M A O O PI O P I P RI P R I β ββ β =× − +× × +× − +× × + ε  
Where OP is the degree of optimism/pessimism, PR is the piece rate a participant received, and 
1.25 I  is an indicator variable picking on the value of one in the participant received a piece rate of 
a $1.25 and zero otherwise.  This allows us to estimate separate effects of optimism/pessimism 
across the treatment variable.  We find no difference across piece rates regarding the effect of 
optimism/pessimism on MAO ( 12 0.026 β β ≈≈ , F(1,81)=0.02 comparing these coefficients).  
  13However, pooling the data (i.e., eliminating the 1.25 I  dummy variable) we find that the degree of 
optimism/pessimism has a small positive effect on MAO ( 0.026, 0.068 p β = = ), suggesting that 
an individual’s MAO increases by $0.50 with a 20 point difference between expected and actual 
performance.  Relative to the typical ultimatum offer of between $3 and $4 (e.g., see discussion 
in Camerer, 2003, chapter 2, and  Holt, 2007, chapter 12), this effect implies a 10%-20% 
difference in one’s MAO resulting from this level of induced optimism/pessimism.  The largest 
effect of MAO is due to the piece rate.  We find  3 2.58 β =  (p<0.01) and  4 10.38 β =   (p<0.01), 
and that these coefficients are significantly different from one another (F(1,81)= 75.38).  Figure 
4 presents the scatterplot of MAO against our measure of optimism/pessimism.  These results 
suggest that the effect of the piece rate on MAO is in some sense discrete: Inducing pessimism in 















 Figure 4:  MAO plotted against optimism measure: $0.25 piece rate given by solid line and 
diamonds; $1.25 piece rate given by dashed line and squares. 
 
4.  DISCUSSION 
  Our key results highlight the interdependence of psychological and behavioral 
phenomena.  Beliefs that were manipulated in a stage 1 experiment significantly affect one’s 
minimum acceptable offer in a stage 2 ultimatum game.  Though these data do not consider the 
robustness of these belief spillover effects into diverse types of environments, they have 
important implications.  While methodologically generating a simple outcome measure, the 
ultimatum game is a building block of many more complicated environments and is inherent in 
  15many economic and social interactions.  Our results demonstrate that pessimism (in an unrelated 
environment) negatively affects what an individual is willing to accept or views as fair in a 
simple bargaining environment (cf. Konow, 2000), suggesting that individuals experiencing 
pessimism view fair offers (and potentially their own deservingness of monies in the experiment) 
below those of other individuals.   
This result can help explain asymmetries in economic outcomes, such as one’s labor 
market outcomes.  Outside the laboratory setting, pessimism about oneself or one’s future 
prospects may emerge from poor initial conditions (e.g. living in poverty) and may have 
subsequent effects in other domains of life.  For example, Oxoby (2004) and Montgomery (1994) 
argue that individuals with low financial endowments experience dissonance regarding their 
adherence to mainstream norms.  As a result, individuals living in poverty may be more likely to 
withdraw effort from the labor market and support from their families.  Indeed this character of 
pessimism or dissonance is inherent in the Council of Europe’s proposed policies to combat 
social exclusion (see Avramov, 2002, and Council of Europe, 2001).  Pessimism of this sort may 
manifest itself in lower starting wages or lower and more infrequent wage increases and 
promotions, both of which may lead to an inferior wage path for pessimistic labor market 
participants.  The inferior wage path would lead to lower relative wages and greater pessimism 
or lower self-esteem (see Goldsmith, et al., 1997), thereby reinforcing the cycle.  As such, 
combating pessimism can be seen as an important aspect in reducing poverty and reducing social 
and economic exclusion.  The implications of understanding spillover effects of 
optimism/pessimism may well extend to a host of other important environments, such as marital 
success, judgment accuracy, or accident rates (Lyubomirsky and King, 2005). 
  16  Methodologically, our first result demonstrates that optimism-pessimism can be 
manipulated in the lab.  The primary importance of this result is that we can then examine 
laboratory-induced beliefs that are orthogonal to one’s general psychological capital, because the 
low versus high piece rates were assigned randomly to subjects.  We exploit the attitudinal 
responses to cognitive dissonance to generate this initial result and believe that this approach has 
applicability beyond our experiments.  In other words, our experimental methodology highlights 
how events can ascribe beliefs, for good or bad, which implies that one’s optimism or pessimism 
is built and rebuilt on a constant basis.  So, even dispositionally pessimistic individuals can be 
ascribed optimism that may be reinforced through spillover effects.
6
  Of course, this research has its limitations.  First, it is unclear whether different types of 
beliefs carry more or less importance when spillover effects exist.  Perhaps pessimism with 
respect to one’s relative abilities on a cognitive task would have a greater affect in environments 
where one interacts with others, such as the ultimatum game.  We examine only one type of 
optimism-pessimism in our experiment, just as we examine only one environment (ultimatum 
bargaining) for spillover effects.  We feel that our examination of unrelated environments during 
belief-manipulation and the bargaining experiment is a virtue of this design, to the extent that 
spillover effects in unrelated environments is a greater challenge to the spillover effect 
hypothesis.  An obvious extension of this research is to examine different types of belief 
manipulation, in perhaps different environments, and explore potential spillover effects beyond 
those in bargaining games. 
                                                 
6 We assume, of course, that our subject pool includes both dispositionally optimistic and pessimistic individuals, 
though we do not gather data on this personality attribute.  This highlights the importance of our initial random 
assignment to the high versus low piece rate task.  Such an approach is similar to the mood induction techniques 
employed by Charness and Levin (2005) and McLeish and Oxoby (2007). 
  17  Our data generally support existing research on cognitive dissonance, as well as 
psychological research on personality disposition.  Dispositional optimism-pessimism is, of 
course, more general than the optimism-pessimism we generate in the lab but, to the extent that 
one’s macro-disposition is the product of micro-beliefs from individual situations, our laboratory 
generated belief structure is significant.  It implies that even psychological constructs are open to 
laboratory manipulation.  This helps make possible more systematic experimental studies of 
beliefs and their spillover effects, which can highlight the more complete impact of one event on 
outcomes elsewhere. 
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This is an experiment in decision-making.  During the experiment you will make a 
number of decisions which will result in a monetary payoff.  You will receive this payment in 
cash at the end of the experiment.  This payment is considered both compensation for the time 
and the effort you put into making your decisions. 
The experiment will proceed in three stages and will last approximately 30 minutes.  We 
ask you to refrain from speaking with one another throughout the course of the experiment.  If 
you have any questions please raise your hand and one the monitors will assist you. 
In the first stage of the experiment, you will engage in a task, which is described next. 
 
The task involves reading a short sentence that describes the order of 3 or 4 letters.  The 
short sentence will appear on your computer screen for exactly 3 seconds.  Your task is to decide 
the correct order of the letters based on the description in the short sentence.  The sentence will 
disappear after 3 seconds and another sentence will not reappear for an additional 5 seconds.  
Before the next sentence appears you are to write down the correct order of the letters (the ones 
that just disappeared) on your ‘LETTER ORDER’ sheet.  New short sentences will keep 
appearing, each time for 3 seconds followed by a 5 second break before the next sentence 
appears.  There will be a total of 64 short sentences that will appear before this portion of the 
experiment is completed.   
Because a 3-letter sentences can possibly imply different letter-orders, depending on your 
interpretation of the sentence, you must determine the proper order of each 3-letter sentence 
by doing the following.  First, determine the order of the first two letters.  Then, keep those two 
letters together and determine where the third letter should go in relation to the first pair of 
letters.  The same rule applies to determining the proper order of each 4-letter sentence.  
First, determine the order of the first two letters.  Then, keep those two letters together and 
determine where the third letter should go in relation to the first pair of letters.  Then, keep those 
three letters together and determine where the fourth letter should go in relation to the first three 
letters. 
Using this rule, there is only one unique letter-order for any 3- or 4-letter sentence, and it 
is the letter-order that comes from using this rule that the experimenter will count as the correct 
response. 
 Here are some examples of short sentences followed by the correct letter-order. 
 Short  sentence                correct  order         
1)  A is followed by D is followed by B is preceded by C                 CADB   
2)  Z does not precede X does not follow Y                  XZY   
 
Once you start the main test, sentences will continue to appear for 3 seconds, followed by 
a 5 second break before the next sentence appears.  For each short sentence you are to write 
down the correct letter order on your ‘LETTER ORDER’ sheet.  You are not allowed to write 
anything on you letter order sheet other than your letter-order response (e.g., writing down the 
sentence to think about it later).  Any such activity will result in your disqualification from the 
experiment!  Recall that the sentences will continue to reappear for a total of 64 total short 
sentences.   
  22  Finally, you will be paid today for each short sentence for which you answer the correct 
letter-order.  The amount you will be paid for each correct letter-order response will either be 
$.25 or $1.25.  You will not know which payment rate applies in advance of completing this 
portion of the test, but whatever rate applies will apply for all 64 sentences.  In other words, if 
the payment is $.25 for each correct letter-order, then we will pay you $.25 times the number of 
correct letter-order responses you made (out of all 64 sentences).  If the payment rate is $1.25, 
then we will pay you $1.25 times the number of correct letter-order responses you made (out of 
all 64 sentences). 
 
After you have completed this first portion of the experiment you will be asked two 
questions.  First, you will be asked to indicate (on a scale of 1-10) how much you enjoyed the 
task.  Secondly, you will be asked to estimate the number of questions you correctly answered.  
You will receive a separate monetary payment based on the accuracy of this estimate.  
Specifically, you will receive a $5.00 payment if your estimate is correct, and you will receive a 
$3.00 payment if you estimate is within two of the actual number of letter-orders you correctly 
indicated. 
After you have entered this information you will be informed of the number of questions 
you correctly answered and your total payoff from the experiment.  You will be asked to 
complete a short questionnaire, after which the experiment will end and you will receive your 
payment for having participated. 
  Once we have answered any questions, the experiment will begin. 
 
 




This is an experiment in decision-making.  During the experiment you will make a 
number of decisions which will result in a monetary payoff.  You will receive this payment in 
cash at the end of the experiment.  This payment is considered both compensation for the time 
and the effort you put into making your decisions. 
The experiment will proceed in three stages and will last approximately 30 minutes.  We 
ask you to refrain from speaking with one another throughout the course of the experiment.  If 
you have any questions please raise your hand and one the monitors will assist you. 
In the first stage of the experiment, you will engage in a task, which is described next. 
 
The task involves reading a short sentence that describes the order of 3 or 4 letters.  The 
short sentence will appear on your computer screen for exactly 3 seconds.  Your task is to decide 
the correct order of the letters based on the description in the short sentence.  The sentence will 
disappear after 3 seconds and another sentence will not reappear for an additional 5 seconds.  
Before the next sentence appears you are to write down the correct order of the letters (the ones 
that just disappeared) on your ‘LETTER ORDER’ sheet.  New short sentences will keep 
appearing for 3 seconds followed by a 5 second break before the next sentence appears.  There 
will be a total of 64 short sentences that will appear before this portion of the experiment is 
completed.   
Because a 3-letter sentence can possibly imply different letter-orders, depending on your 
interpretation of the sentence, you must determine the proper order of each 3-letter sentence 
by doing the following.  First, determine the order of the first two letters.  Then, keep those two 
letters together and determine where the third letter should go in relation to the first pair of 
letters.  The same rule applies to determining the proper order of each 4-letter sentence.  
First, determine the order of the first two letters.  Then, keep those two letters together and 
determine where the third letter should go in relation to the first pair of letters.  Then, keep those 
three letters together and determine where the fourth letter should go in relation to the first three 
letters. 
Using this rule, there is only one unique letter-order for any 3- or 4-letter sentence, and it 
is the letter-order that comes from using this rule that the experimenter will count as the correct 
response. 
 Here are some examples of short sentences followed by the correct letter-order. 
 Short  sentence                correct  order         
1)  A is followed by D is followed by B is preceded by C                 CADB   
2)  Z does not precede X does not follow Y                  XZY   
 
Once you start the main test, sentences will continue to appear for 3 seconds, followed by 
a 5 second break before the next sentence appears.  For each short sentence you are to write 
down the correct letter order on your ‘LETTER ORDER’ sheet.  You are not allowed to write 
anything on you letter order sheet other than your letter-order response (e.g., writing down the 
sentence to think about it later).  Any such activity will result in your disqualification from the 
experiment!  Recall that the sentences will continue to reappear for a total of 64 total short 
sentences.   
  24  Finally, you will be paid today for each short sentence for which you answer the correct 
letter-order.  The amount you will be paid for each correct letter-order response will either be 
$.25 or $.75.  You will not know which payment rate applies in advance of completing this 
portion of the test, but whatever rate applies will apply for all 64 sentences.  In other words, if 
the payment is $.25 for each correct letter-order, then we will pay you $.25 times the number of 
correct letter-order responses you made (out of all 64 sentences).  If the payment rate is $.75, 
then we will pay you $.75 times the number of correct letter-order responses you made (out of all 
64 sentences). 
 
After you have completed this first portion of the experiment you will be asked two 
questions.  First, you will be asked to indicate (on a scale of 1-10) how much you enjoyed the 
task.  Secondly, you will be asked to estimate the number of questions you correctly answered.  
You will receive a separate monetary payment based on the accuracy of this estimate.  
Specifically, you will receive a $5.00 payment if your estimate is correct, and you will receive a 
$3.00 payment if you estimate is within two of the actual number of letter-orders you correctly 
indicated. 
After you have entered this information you will be informed of the number of questions 
you correctly answered and your total payoff from this part of the experiment.   
Next, you will randomly be matched with another person.  Eventually, the computer will 
assign one of you to the role of Proposer and one of you to the role of Responder. Before this 
random assignment is made, you must indicate what you would do if you were put in either role.  
In the role of Proposer, you will be asked how much (out of a total of $10) you wish to allocate 
to the other person.  The amount of money that you keep for yourself will be $10 minus your 
allocation to the other person.  In the role of Responder, you must indicate for each possible 
amount allocated to you from the Proposer whether you would accept or reject such an offer.  
The computer will then randomly assign each person in the pair to the role of Proposer or 
Responder, and their corresponding choices will be implemented.  That is, the person assigned 
the role of Proposer will have their offer extended to the Responder; the Responder will accept or 
reject the offer based on the choices made for the relevant amount of the offer. If it turns out that 
the Responder accepts the Proposer’s offer, both people receive the amounts agreed upon.  
However, if the Responder rejects the Proposer’s offer, both people receive nothing.   
Your earnings from this portion of the experiment will be added to your previous 
earnings to make up your final payoff. 
You will be asked to complete a short questionnaire, after which the experiment will end 
and you will receive your payment for having participated. 




1.   If you are assigned the role of Proposer and you indicated that you would allocate the 
other person $3, how much will you receive if this offer is accepted? 
2.   If you are assigned the role of Responder and you are allocated $6, how much will you 
receive if you indicated that you would accept a $6 offer? How much will you receive if you 
indicated that you would reject a $6 offer? 
 
 
  25Appendix C: Answer sheet used in both experiments 
 
Please indicate the letter order from each of the numbered short sentences that appears.  You are 




My letter order 
response 
  Sentence 
number 
My letter order 
response 
1)     33)   
2)     34)   
3)     35)   
4)     36)   
5)     37)   
6)     38)   
7)     39)   
8)     40)   
9)     41)   
10)     42)  
11)     43)  
12)     44)  
13)     45)  
14)     46)  
15)     47)  
16)     48)  
17)     49)  
18)     50)  
19)     51)  
20)     52)  
21)     53)  
22)     54)  
23)     55)  
24)     56)  
25)     57)  
26)     58)  
27)     59)  
28)     60)  
29)     61)  
30)     62)  
31)     63)  
32)     64)  
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